Introduction
In a wide variety of situations, people make decisions on the basis of information supplied by other people. Often those who provide information have a "stake" in the …nal decision. A prominent example of such a situation is a civil lawsuit involving a dispute between two parties about a distributional issue. Each party supplies information in an attempt to in ‡uence the judge's decision in its own favor. Another well-known example is a politician who makes a decision that a¤ects various interest groups. Again each group may provide information with an eye on in ‡uencing the politician's …nal decision to its own bene…t. When decisions are made on the basis of information provided by interested parties, there are usually two (related) concerns.
First, interested parties have incentives to reveal information that is favorable for them, but to conceal information that is unfavorable for them. As a result, the decision maker possibly does not hear all available information. Second, the means of interest groups vary widely. An implication is that decisions may be biased towards the interests of the more powerful interest groups.
The main objective of this paper is to shed light on these two concerns. To this end, we develop a game-theoretical model in which a neutral person has to resolve a distributional dispute between two parties; say, an amount of money is to be distributed. The socially optimal decision depends on the state of the world.
The parties, however, have opposite interests that do not depend on the state of the world. As to learning the state, the decision maker has to rely on information provided by the parties. We assume that the parties do not observe the state of the world 1 , but each party can exert e¤ort to …nd veri…able information about it.
The more e¤ort a party puts in collecting information, the higher is the probability that a party receives veri…able information about the state. If information is found, a party has to determine whether to reveal or conceal it. An important feature of our model is that parties may di¤er in the (marginal) cost they attach to exerting e¤ort. The implication is that there is a relatively advantaged party and a relatively disadvantaged party. In this way, we are able to address the concern regarding the in ‡uence of powerful interest groups on decisions. Another important feature of our model is that given the available information, the decision maker aims at making the socially optimal decision.
We derive four main results. The …rst one is neither novel nor surprising. Parties reveal information that promotes their interests, but conceal information that damages their interests.
Our second result is more subtle. The party that is relatively advantaged in terms of collecting information has stronger incentives to reveal it. The reason for this result is that when the advantaged party does not reveal information, the decision maker is inclined to believe that the party has something to hide. As a result, when neither party presents evidence, the decision is biased towards the interest of the disadvantaged party.
Third, in expected terms, the …nal decision does not depend on the relative strength of the parties. This neutrality result sheds light on the role of powerful interest groups in politics. Our model predicts that indeed relatively powerful interest groups frequently provide information that shapes policy. However, our model also predicts that if powerful interest groups do not provide information, decisions are made against their interests. In expected terms, these e¤ects cancel out because of the Martingale property.
Our …nal result is that a policy that compels parties to reveal information destroys their incentives to collect information.
Together our results indicate that the concern that interested parties have incentives to conceal information is justi…ed. However, compelling parties to supply information does not help. It would only weaken incentives to collect information.
The concern for biased decisions because some parties have easier access to information than others is less justi…ed. Rational decision makers take the relative strength of parties into account in such a way that di¤erences in the power of parties do not lead to biases in decisions.
It is important to point out from the outset that we obtain our results from a model of informational lobbying, in which the decision maker is unbiased. Of course, once the decision maker is biased or can be bribed our result that in expected terms the relative power of parties is irrelevant does not hold any more.
Literature
Our paper is related to two broad strands of economic literature. improves with the amount of resources a group spends and thus provide a rationale for why interest groups spend more than is necessary to communicate messages.
The Model
Our model describes a situation where a decision has to be made with important distributional consequences. One can think, for example, of the allocation of a tax.
We assume that it is common knowledge that there is a socially optimal decision in the sense that reasons may exist why one party should be favored to the determint of another party. To learn these reasons, the decision maker relies on the information supplied by the interested parties. We consider a setting in which each party wants to make a case for itself.
A decision maker has to make a decision on x. One can think of the decision maker as a politician, a CEO, or a judge. The problem is that the proper decision is uncertain. This uncertainty is re ‡ected by the stochastic term , the state of the world, which is uniformly distributed on the interval [l; h]. The decision maker chooses x so as to minimize the expected deviation of x from , given the information I it possesses: min x : E (jx j jI).
To learn , the decision maker has to rely on information provided by two interested parties, i 2 fa; bg. One can think of a party as an interest group, a manager of a division, or an attorney. Neither party knows initially. However, each party may collect information to learn and receive a signal s i 2 f ; g : Collecting information
is costly. Speci…cally, we assume that each party i chooses e¤ort i 2 [0; 1), where i denotes the probability with which party i …nds veri…able information about , s i = . With probability 1 i party i does not …nd information, s i = ?. For simplicity, we assume that the cost of information collection is quadratic:
4 An important feature of our model is that a may di¤er from 4 In the appendix we show that if i 1 2 (h l), an equilibrium exists in which party i chooses i = 1 and always reveals information to the decision maker. As a result, party i is redundant. By assuming i > 1 2 (h l), we ensure that the model focuses on environments where both parties have incentives to collect information. This is the most relevant environment to investigate how the relative strength of parties a¤ects decisions.
b . If a < b , we say that party a is the more powerful party. The parameter i may capture a few things. First, i may depend on the resources party i possesses to collect information. Second, the e¢ ciency with which a party collects information may a¤ect i . Third, i may depend on party i's position in the economy. For instance, information about the impact of a deregulation in an industry often lies in the hands of that industry. In this paper, we take a broad view of the various factors that may determine i .
We assume that the two parties have opposing preferences. Party a wants the decision maker to choose a high value of x, whereas party b wants the decision maker to choose a low value of x. The payo¤s to party a and b are given by:
and
respectively:
After the parties have collected information, the communication stage starts. In this stage, the two parties simultaneously send a message, m i , to the decision maker.
A party conditions its message on the information it received, m i (s i ). We assume that information cannot be forged but can be concealed. We assume that the structure of the game and the distribution of is common knowledge. Our model is a dynamic game with imperfect information. We solve it by backward induction and identify Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE). The decision maker chooses x so as to minimize E (jx j jm a ; m b ). Parties anticipate the decision maker's decision rule.
The Communication Stage
Each party enters the communication stage either with the possibility to present evidence to the decision maker or without this possibility. This depends on whether or not a party was successful in the information collection stage. We call a party that is able to reveal information "informed", and a party that is not able "uninformed".
By 
For party b, the same equation can be derived.
A direct implication of Proposition 1 is that in case both parties are able to provide evidence, the decision maker makes the full-information decision. This result is similar to the result derived by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) that competition between informed parties whose preferences are opposed leads to full-information decisions. Proposition 1 also implies that parties never provide evidence that con ‡icts with their own interests.
Information Collection
We now turn to a party's decision on how much e¤ort to put in collecting veri…-able information. Consider party a. When choosing a party a anticipates that it will only reveal information in the communication stage if T . Moreover, it
anticipates that if party b …nds information, it will reveal it if and only if T .
Finally, it knows that revealing leads to x = . The expected payo¤ to party a when choosing a equals
The …rst (second) term of (4) pertains to the range of for which party a (b) reveals information if it is found. The third term gives the cost of e¤ort.
Di¤erentiating (4) with respect to a ; and using
Equation (5) shows that the higher is the deviation of T from h, the more e¤ort party a puts in collecting information. Of course, the reason for this result is that the deviation of T from h is directly related to the probability that party a will utilize its information. To put it somewhat di¤erently, party a has stronger incentives to collect information when it anticipates that the information is likely to be favorable to its cause. Obviously, it also has stronger incentives when the cost of collecting information is small. 5 Because of our assumption i > 1 2 (h l), a < 1.
In a similar way, one can derive the amount of e¤ort party b exerts:
Note that party b's e¤ort strategy is the converse of party a's strategy. When party b anticipates that it is likely to …nd information that is favorable to its cause, it has strong incentives to collect information.
6 The threshold (l + h). Together these events imply the following expression for
which can be rewritten as, . Clearly, the lower is T , the higher is a . Again, this e¤ect has a clear intuition. Party a anticipates that in case the decision maker does not receive information about , he will make a decision that is biased against its interest. This gives a stronger incentive for party a to collect information.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium,
T is implicitly determined by (8). If i < i and m a = m b = ?, a decision is made that is biased against party i. This further strengthens party i's incentives to put e¤ort in collecting information.
Proof. See appendix. However, we have also shown that in case a powerful interest group does not provide information, the decision is biased against its interest.
The next proposition shows that the relative strength of interest groups does not a¤ect the expected decision on x.
Proposition 3 In expected terms, the value of i relative to i does not a¤ect the decision on x.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3 is a direct implication of the Martingale property and we interpret it as a neutrality result. Of course, when one of the assumptions of our model is relaxed the neutrality result may break down. For example, we have asssumed that the decision maker knows the relative strength of parties. If the decision maker were to have a wrong perception of i , the neutrality result would no longer hold.
Underestimation of the relative strength of a party induces the decision maker, in expected terms, to choose a policy that is favorable for that party. It is also important to emphasize that the neutrality result only holds for informative lobbying.
Evidently, allowing for bribes may alter our results.
Forcing parties to reveal their information
In the previous sections we have analyzed incentives of parties to collect and supply information. We have shown that a party only reveals information that bene…ts its cause. In the current section we examine the implications of a policy that forces each party to reveal its information, whether that information is favorable for it or not. Such a policy in our model is akin to the assumption that information cannot be concealed. Consequently, the communication strategy of party i be-
, and m i (?) = ?. Note that in this setting the expected value of when the decision maker does not receive information equals
The resulting model revolves around information collection. When choosing the amount of e¤ort to exert, parties anticipate that any information they …nd will be revealed, leading to x = . Thus, the expected payo¤ to party a when choosing a is
The …rst term is the expected payo¤ in case neither party …nds information. The Proposition 4 casts doubts on the e¢ ciency of rules in legal systems that compel prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant.
Costly Communication
So far, we have focused on a situation where parties have to exert e¤ort to …nd
information. An alternative situation is that parties have information but have to make e¤ort to convey it to the decision maker. 6 To analyze the latter case, we assume that when choosing their strategies on e¤ort, parties know . In the new 6 Empirical research suggests that interest groups expend resources to convey their messages to policy makers. For a review of empirical models of interest group in ‡uence see Potters and Sloof (1996) and Stratmann (2005) . model, i denotes the probability that party i is able to provide veri…able evidence to the decision maker, and i can be interpreted as a measure of party i's accessbility to the decision maker. Speci…cally, in the alternative game we have that (1) nature chooses and reveals it to the parties, but not to the decision maker; (2) each party chooses e¤ort on the basis of , i ( ); (3) if party i is able to reveal information, it reveals it or conceals it; (4) the decision maker chooses x.
The assumption about the observability of does not have consequences for the strategies followed in the communication stage. The communication strategies can again be characterized by a single threshold, T . Each party only reveals information when it perceives that it will lead to a more favorable decision.
Incentives to exert e¤ort, however, are di¤erent in the present model. Because each party observes the state, e¤ort is conditional on the state. The more favorable is the state to party i, the stronger are its incentives to exert e¤ort. 7 Moreover, if
T , party a does not exert e¤ort, and if T party b does not exert e¤ort.
Thus, either party a or party b tries to convey information.
The assumption about the observability of does not a¤ect our main result that in expected terms, the relative power of parties does not in ‡uence the decision on
x. Of course, the reason is that also in the present model the Martingale property implies that the expected value of x equals 1 2
(l + h).
Conclusion
Do more powerful interest groups have a disproportionate in ‡uence on policy? We have shown in this paper that in an environment where interest groups try to in ‡u-ence decisions by concealing or revealing information, the answer to this question is in the negative. By often providing information, more powerful interest groups do frequently in ‡uence policies. However, when they abstain from providing information, decisions are biased against their interests. In expected terms, these e¤ects cancel out.
We regard our neutrality result as a benchmark. Interest groups may systematically a¤ect policies in case the assumptions underlying our model are violated. For instance, we have assumed that the decision maker forms expectations in a rational way. In practice, this means that the decision maker should distinguish between cases where more powerful interest groups do not provide information and cases where less powerful interest groups do not provide information. Moreover, our neutrality result requires that the decision maker correctly assess the abilities of interest groups to collect information. Finally, we have ignored the possibilities that interest groups bribe decision makers and that decision makers may already have ideological preferences over policies.
Appendix
As mentioned in Section 3, we assume i > 
Proof of Proposition 2
First we show T is decreasing in a and increasing in b : (8) solves for,
This implies,
We need to show that a + b + 2 p (l + h) + e, so e < 0 implies T < 1 2
(l + h) :
Substituting in (9) implies, (l + h).
(: Assume T < 1 2
(l + h). Then (9) reduces to, If h = l, equation (7) reduces to,
Using this, we have E (x) = 0.
Proof Proposition 4
See main text.
